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Abstract 
This essay introduces the ‘she said, he said’ paradox for Title IX investigations. ‘She said, he 
said’ cases are accusations of rape, followed by denials, with no further significant case-specific 
evidence available to the evaluator. In such cases, usually the accusation is true. Title IX 
investigations adjudicate sexual misconduct accusations in US educational institutions; I address 
whether they should be governed by the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard of proof or 
the higher ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard.  
Orthodoxy holds that the ‘preponderance’ standard is satisfied if the evidence adduced 
renders the litigated claim more likely than not. On this view, I argue, ‘she said, he said’ cases 
satisfy the ‘preponderance’ standard. But this consequence conflicts with plausible liberal and 
feminist claims. In this essay I contrast the ‘she said, he said’ paradox with legal epistemology’s 
proof paradox. I explain how both paradoxes arise from the distinction between individualised 
and non-individualised evidence, and I critically evaluate responses to the ‘she said, he said’ 
paradox.   
 
Keywords Rape accusations, Title IX investigations, proof paradox, individualised evidence, 
legal standards of proof, preponderance of the evidence. 
 
   
1. Introduction 
A ‘she said, he said’ case is when a third-party evaluator hears—or hears of—a rape accusation and 
denial, but they lack any other significant individualised evidence that bears on the case. There are no 
additional witnesses, compelling alibi, earlier confession, string of similar accusations, and so on. The 
only case-specific evidence amounts to ‘one person’s word against another’. But this does not mean 
the testimonies are epistemically balanced. In ‘she said, he said’ cases, probably the accusation is true. 
This epistemic asymmetry underwrites a paradox.  
 
This essay describes and motivates the ‘she said, he said’ paradox for legal standards of proof. I first 
summarise some legal background. In section two I introduce the paradox. I then contrast it with the 
more familiar ‘proof paradox’ and, in section four, explain how both paradoxes arise from the 
distinction between individualised and non-individualised evidence. The remainder of the essay 
critically evaluates responses to the paradox.  
 
Title IX investigations adjudicate accusations of sexual misconduct at US higher education institutions. 
The procedures determine whether university policy was violated and, if so, impose sanctions. In 2011 
the Obama administration decreed that Title IX proceedings should be governed by the 
‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard. Preponderance of the evidence, also known as the ‘balance 
of probabilities’ standard, is relatively low. The standard, which governs US civil cases involving 
money, is often glossed as more likely than not, or more than 50% probable, given the evidence 
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adduced. Betsy DeVos, education secretary in the Trump administration, countermanded the Obama-
era regulation. From August 2020, institutions can choose between the preponderance standard or the 
more demanding ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard. The clear and convincing evidence 
standard, which is often quantified as around 70% or 75% probability, governs civil cases involving 
family, such as paternity disputes and child custody, and significant life decisions such as right-to-die 
hearings and involuntary commitment to mental institutions. Under DeVos’s guidelines, the 
institution must be consistent—it cannot vacillate between standards—but the lower standard is not 
mandated.1  
 
 
2. Conflicting Claims 
The ‘she said, he said’ paradox comprises six claims. Each claim is independently plausible, but they 
are inconsistent. At least one must be rejected.  
 
Claim A. ‘Preponderance’ is the correct standard 
The ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard should govern Title IX proceedings for sexual 
misconduct hearings in US educational institutions.  
 
Claim B. Gloss on ‘preponderance’ standard 
The ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard is satisfied if, after a well-executed investigation, 
given the evidence adduced, the proposition is probably true.  
 
Claim C. ‘She said, he said’ evidence favours accuser 
Normally in ‘she said, he said’ cases, based on the available evidence, the accusation is probably 
true. 
 
Claim D. Considerable consequences 
Finding an individual culpable of rape can warrant considerable consequences, such as 
expulsion.  
 
Claim E. Liberal claim 
In some cases of mere one-on-one conflicting testimony, considerable institutional 
consequences—such as expulsion—are not legitimatised because the evidence is mere one-on-
one competing testimony from two antagonists, absent any further significant individualised 
evidence about the particular case.  
 
Claim F. Connector claim 
At least some conflicting testimony cases described by Claim E are normal ‘she said, he said’ 
cases, like those featured in Claim C.  
 
The grip of the paradox is this: Suppose one hears standard ‘she said, he said’ conflicting testimony—
a rape accusation and denial—but lacks further significant case-specific significant evidence. For at 
least some such cases, the following holds: Claim C says that, based on the available evidence, probably 
the accusation is true. So, given Claims A and B, a Title IX investigation should find the accused 
culpable. Given Claim D, the accused ought to face considerable consequences such as expulsion. But 
                                               
1  Simon and Mahan (1971); Gersen (2019). Gardiner (2019b) suggests the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard 
plausibly corresponds to knowledge-level justification.  
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the case qualifies as mere one-on-one conflicting testimony so—Claim E holds—for at least some 
such cases, considerable sanctions are not legitimated. Claim F, the connector claim, holds that such 
cases are possible: Claims C and E can describe the same testimonial conflict. Claim F, if true, 
precludes responding to the paradox by holding that ‘she said’ he said’ cases are a different subset of 
testimonial conflict cases from those circumscribed by Claim E’s liberal commitment.2  
 
Some clarifications: Firstly, whether an accusation and denial qualify as a ‘she said, he said’ case can 
vary by evaluator. One person might only hear an accusation and denial, for example, whilst another 
person additionally hears a confession. Confessions are normally significant inculpatory evidence, 
which disqualifies the case from being ‘she said, he said’. Secondly, ‘she said, he said’ cases are a 
distinctive subset of rape claims. They pick out an accused assailant, the accused learns of the 
accusation and responds with a denial. Accordingly they typically concern acquaintance rape, not 
stranger rape. Acquaintance rape is more common than stranger rape, and Title IX investigations in 
particular usually involve acquaintance rape accusations.3 This essay focuses on acquaintance rape.  
 
Thirdly, the liberal claim focuses on cases of competing testimony between involved antagonists, 
rather than disinterested parties, for which an institution formally sanctions one party. The liberal 
commitment cautions against condemnation based only on one person’s word, where that person 
knows in advance of the accusation that no other evidence can emerge absent their change of heart 
and that their accusation suffices by itself for considerable consequences. It does not claim that 
accusations never suffice for severe sanctions; it claims they are sometimes insufficient. Fourthly, 
readers should think of cases, or sets of cases, that are most plausibly described by Claims A to F, 
rather than focusing on cases that are exceptions. As I explain below, the paradox requires only one 
such case. If no such cases are possible, this itself is somewhat surprising, and demands explanation.  
 
Finally, I do not defend Claim C in this essay. Denying Claim C would resolve the paradox, but is 
implausible. Claim C is hard to dispute partly because it is relatively weak; it merely says such 
accusations are probably true.4  
 
 
3. The Proof Paradox 
The ‘she said, he said’ paradox may evoke legal epistemology’s proof paradox. The proof paradox is 
generated by contrasting two vignettes, such as the following.5 
 
Gatecrasher One. A theatre sells admittance but does not issue tickets or record who paid. One 
day many people gatecrash. Given the number of till transactions, the manager realises 200 of the 
300 attendees gatecrashed. He sues arbitrarily selected attendees for the entrance fee; Pam is one 
of those selected. The manager reasons that, given the base rates, Pam probably gatecrashed.  
 
                                               
2  This potential response was raised by Amia Srinivasan. I am also grateful to EJ Coffman, Jon Garthoff, and Daniel 
Nolan for feedback on the paradox’s structure.  
3  See, for example, Lisak (2010) and Krebs et al (2007).  
4  Gardiner (ms) defends Claim C, including by arguing that false rape accusations are rare.  
5  Adapted from Cohen (1977). Other proof paradox vignettes target other legal standards, such as ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’. See Redmayne (2008), Gardiner (2018; 2019a), Pardo (2019) for surveys. Gardiner (2020) argues proof paradox 
vignettes exhibit overlooked but epistemically significant differences, and accordingly some explanations of the 
inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for legal proof cannot explain the full range of vignettes. 
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Gatecrasher Two. A theatre sells admittance but does not issue tickets or record who paid. One 
day a few people gatecrash. Given the number of till transactions, the manager realises 10 of the 
300 attendees gatecrashed. An employee says he witnessed a particular attendee, Sam, gatecrash. 
The manager sues Sam for the entrance fee.  
 
Given the available evidence, plausibly the defendant’s culpability is more probable in Gatecrasher 
One than in Gatecrasher Two. This is because the gatecrashing base rates are far higher. The 
Gatecrasher Two evidence includes eyewitness testimony, but eyewitness stranger identification is 
notoriously unreliable.6 Yet Gatecrasher Two evidence is the kind that can legitimate an affirmative 
verdict, whereas Gatecrasher One evidence cannot. This is the heart of the proof paradox. 
 
‘Quantifiable balance’ conceptions of legal standards of proof claim that legal standards are numerical 
thresholds of probability given the available evidence. On this widely-endorsed conception, the 
preponderance standard is satisfied if the litigated claim exceeds 50% probability given the evidence.  
 
The proof paradox can be constructed as four incompatible claims: 
 
Claim 1. The ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard should govern lawsuits in small claims 
courts.  
 
Claim 2. The ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard is satisfied if, after a well-executed 
investigation, given the evidence adduced, the proposition is more than 50% probable.  
 
Claim 3. In Gatecrasher One, the evidential probability that an arbitrarily selected attendee 
gatecrashed exceeds 50%.  
 
Claim 4. The evidence against Pam, an arbitrarily selected attendee in Gatecrasher One, is 
insufficient for finding Pam legally liable for gatecrashing.   
 
Evidence adduced in Gatecrasher One renders Pam’s guilt above 50% probable (Claim Three), yet 
intuitively the evidence does not suffice for an affirmative verdict (Claim Four). This challenges the 
quantifiable balance conception of legal proof (Claim Two).  
 
For some theorists—myself included—‘proof paradox’ is a misnomer because the vignettes do not 
exemplify anything paradoxical; instead they simply illustrate that Claim Two is false and standards of 
proof are not numerical probability thresholds. As I explain in section six, these theorists can still find 
the ‘she said, he said’ paradox paradoxical because it cannot be resolved by simply denying the 
quantifiable balance conception of standards of proof.   
 
 
4. Individualised Evidence 
The proof paradox arises from the distinction between non-individualised and individualised 
evidence.7 Individualised evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, is specific to features of the 
                                               
6  See, for example, Simon (2012).  
7  This distinction is controversial. Controversies include whether the distinction is tenable, how to characterise it, and 
what, if any, is the distinction’s moral, social, or epistemic import. See, for example, Thomson (1986), Schmalbeck 
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particular case. Non-individualised evidence is general, and includes base rate evidence, social data, 
and background information about, for example, psychology and culture. Suppose S judges whether 
an adult, Ahmed, is taller than a teenager, Tim. Non-individualised evidence includes claims like adults 
are on average taller than teenagers. Individualised evidence includes evidence about their particular 
heights. The gatecrasher-to-payer ratio is non-individualised because it is not specific to Pam’s guilt. 
The distinction underlies the proof paradox because, the thought goes, the court ought not find Pam 
culpable on non-individualised evidence alone; affirmative verdicts require individualised inculpatory 
evidence. One motivation for this is that non-individualised evidence is typically insensitive to the 
litigated claim; regardless of culpability, base rates and background social facts are about the same. 
Whether Pam gatecrashed makes no difference to the inculpatory evidence in Gatecrasher One. 
Eyewitness testimony, by contrast, is typically sensitive to culpability.8   
 
The distinction between non-individualised and individualised evidence similarly underlies the ‘she 
said, he said’ paradox. Non-individualised evidence underwrites Claim C. Rape accusations generally 
tend to be true. Denials, plausibly, are usually false. This means the truth-to-falsity ratio in the ‘rape 
accusation’ reference class is high. Typically accusers have incentives to tell the truth, whereas deniers’ 
incentives are frequently to lie. Deniers are more likely than accusers, as a class, to hold false beliefs 
about whether rape occurred. This evidence, which supports Claim C, pertains to the general class of 
accusations and denials. Given background base rates and social information, when a third-party 
evaluator hears (or hears of) an accusation and denial absent further significant individualised 
evidence, probably, given the available evidence, the accusation is true.9   
 
Claim E is also motivated by the distinction between non-individualised and individualised evidence. 
In the relevant class of conflicting testimony cases, the accusation is the only significant individualised 
inculpatory evidence. Other than the conflicting testimonies, the individuals seem equally veracious 
and upstanding; there is no other individualised reason to suspect one party or the other lacks 
credibility.10 Suppose the accused is expelled, for example, because rape accusations tend to be true. 
This means the individual is punished, in large part, based on membership of a class, such as ‘those 
accused of rape’, and the generalised features of the class—they are usually guilty. The liberal concern 
fears this is an illegitimate kind of profiling. Were the accused innocent, the supporting evidence would 
nonetheless obtain; the background evidence is insensitive to guilt in the individual case.11  
 
 
5. Flexibility 
The ‘she said, he said’ paradox shares various other features with the proof paradox. Both are located 
at the intersection of evidence and action, particularly where that action is—or is mediated by—a 
                                               
(1986), Schoeman (1987), Schauer (2003), Di Bello and O’Neil (forthcoming), Bolinger (this volume), Littlejohn (this 
volume), and Smith (this volume).  
8  Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012), Blome-Tillmann (2015), and Gardiner (2018) discuss the relation between 
individualised evidence and sensitivity. Wright (this volume; ms) defends the view that testimony is not evidence of 
the truth of the asserted content. 
9  Gardiner (ms) defends these claims at length.  
10  Crucially the conflicting testimonies are epistemically significant; there is no further significant individualised evidence.  
11  I grant that most accusations are sensitive to guilt: if the rape did not occur, the accusation would not have been issued. 
But the evidence underwriting Claim C is non-individualised and so is insensitive to guilt. The liberal concern is that if 
this non-individualised, insensitive evidence is why the institutional authority favours the accuser’s assertion over the 
accused, and imposes considerable sanctions, this qualifies as profiling. In future research I will address whether the 
liberal concern similarly applies to other assertions, not just antagonist accusation, and whether adjacent paradoxes 
arise for other kinds of investigation. Thanks to Jon Garthoff and Jon Robson for helpful discussions on these topics. 
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formal finding of culpability. They both threaten the quantifiable balance conception of legal standards 
of proof. They both need only one plausible case to be efficacious. Gatecrasher One need not have 
happened; the thought experiment alone suggests the preponderance standard is not a quantifiable 
balance threshold. Similarly, the mere plausibility of a ‘she said, he said’ case described by Claims C 
and E suffices; the case need not actually obtain. 
 
We can thus imagine cases, for example, where ‘she said, he said’ testimonies are mediated through 
testimonial transition. The Title IX investigator never interviews the accuser or accused; she simply 
hears second-hand reports. In this imaginary ‘Transmitted Accusation’ case, the accusation is probably 
true given the evidence available to the administrator (Claim C), and yet the administrator should not 
normally expel the accused based on this evidence (Claim E). Thus the paradox can arise from fictional 
examples. Note, though, I think the tension amongst the six claims—tension rooted in the distinction 
between individualised and non-individualised evidence—arises for some real-life cases.  
 
The ‘she said, he said’ paradox is inherently flexible; this flexibility is a strength because Claims C and 
E are accordingly plausible to a wider range of readers. It stems from flexibility in what qualifies as a 
‘she said, he said’ case, compared to an accusation and denial augmented with significant additional 
individualised evidence. Consider, for example, an accusation and denial plus the further fact that the 
accuser seemed unperturbed the day after the alleged rape. Some people judge this behaviour to be 
significant evidence against the accusation, and so do not regard the case a ‘she said, he said’ case. 
Others regard the behaviour as nonprobative or insignificant, and so consistent with its being a ‘she 
said, he said’ case. Regardless of who is correct about whether the behaviour is significant evidence, 
they disagree about which cases are described by Claim C. Here is why the flexibility is a strength: 
What matters is only that at least some cases described by Claim C are also cases described by Claim 
E. Theorists can disagree about which cases satisfy this requirement. If a theorist can think of cases, 
real or imaged, such that on their view both Claims C and E hold for that case, the paradox arises. 
This condition is articulated by Claim F, the Connector Claim.  
 
Some theorists have a narrow conception of ‘she said, he said’ cases, in which few examples qualify. 
They hold that almost any individualised additional facts—such as character references, how the 
parties emote during testimony, and who can reliably recall details—count as sufficiently significant 
to disqualify the case from being ‘she said, he said’.12 Other theorists have a broader conception, so 
that more cases qualify as ‘she said, he said’ cases. They regard various additional individualised facts, 
such as emotions exhibited during testimony, as nonprobative or paltry and so consistent with the 
cases being ‘she said, he said’ cases. Other theorists might focus on one specific real-life or imaginary 
case, such as Transmitted Accusation. One can read Claim C as about what is typical, characteristic or 
normal for all ‘she said, he said’ cases, a subset, or at least common for a wide class of ‘she said, he 
said’ cases. There is even flexibility about whether ‘she said, he said’ cases are limited to bald 
accusations and denials or can include narrative details about what occurred.13 What matters is only 
that, as articulated by the Connector Claim, in at least some such case the accusation is probably true, 
given non-individualised evidence, but considerable consequences are illegitimate because the 
inculpatory evidence is insufficient.   
                                               
12  As I argue in section nine and Gardiner (ms), I think the narrow conception is mistaken because most such facts are 
paltry or nonprobative.  
13  With thanks to Jon Robson for helpful comments about the scope of ‘she said, he said’ cases. Gardiner (ms) discusses 
the epistemological consequences of supplying further narrative details, including outlining how such details can fuel 
doubt.  
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6. Relative Strengths 
In addition to the similarities, the ‘she said, he said’ paradox also differs from the proof paradox. I 
articulate two potential weaknesses of the ‘she said, he said’ paradox relative to the proof paradox, and 
then describe relative strengths. Note that describing comparative strengths and weaknesses of the 
two paradoxes is largely a rhetorical device to enhance understanding of the paradoxes; there is no 
competition between the paradoxes.14 Firstly, insofar as the two paradoxes challenge the quantifiable 
balance conception of standards of proof, the ‘she said, he said’ paradox has a disadvantage. There are 
various alternative claims one might reject in order to defend the claim that the ‘preponderance’ 
standard is satisfied if the litigated claim’s evidential probability exceeds 0.5. A theorist might respond 
by rejecting Claim A or E, for example. The proof paradox, by contrast, has fewer alternative 
resolutions.  
 
Secondly proof paradox vignettes are—at least superficially—clean and straightforward. There is 
relatively little disagreement about how to interpret Gatecrasher vignettes. There is less agreement and 
clarity about precisely delineating ‘she said, he said’ cases. The tension underwriting the paradox can 
be correspondingly harder to appreciate.15   
 
The proof paradox vignettes are clean, straightforward, fictional vignettes. This apparent simplicity is, 
in some respects, a virtue. But these features are also a weakness. They are unrealistic, artificial, pretend 
cases. The proof paradox is dismissed by theorists who claim such cases never actually arise and so 
cannot inform the epistemology of legal proof.16 It is difficult to reconcile the lack of further evidence 
in proof paradox vignettes, furthermore, with the stipulation that the investigation was conducted 
appropriately. Realistically in Gatecrasher One, for example, security footage would be available, 
attendees would be questioned, and so on. The lack of further individualised evidence against Pam is 
suspicious and implies a flawed investigation.   
 
In ‘she said, he said’ cases, by contrast, the absence of further significant individualised evidence is—
in many cases—normal and expected. It is not suspicious because rape often lacks corroborating 
evidence; lack of other witnesses and evidence is often a pre-condition for the attack. The cases are 
accordingly not so easily dismissed as a challenge to the quantifiable balance conception of legal proof. 
That is, the ‘she said he said’ paradox cannot be disregarded as hinging on artificial, unrealistic vignettes 
or stipulations. 
 
A second virtue of the ‘she said, he said’ paradox, relative to the proof paradox, is that we feel the 
tension for real-life cases, which fuels an urgency to resolving the paradox. It is not merely an abstract 
intellectual puzzle; it is a challenge society must address. Even if strict ‘she said, he said’ cases are rare, 
various responses to the paradox bear on how we should treat rape accusations that are not strictly 
‘she said, he said’ cases. The resolution has policy implications. Some interlocutors oppose Claim D 
for Title IX investigations, for example, to protect Claims A and E.17 If we jettison the liberal 
                                               
14  Thanks to Cécile Degiovanni for insightful comments on this topic. 
15  Gardiner (2020) argues the apparent simplicity of many proof paradox vignettes is illusive. Unclarity about how to 
precisely delineate the class of ‘she said, he said’ cases might also obscure that ultimately there is no paradox: Perhaps 
Claim F is false and there are no relevant possible cases. Section nine discusses this response to the paradox.  
16  See, for example, Allen (forthcoming). Enoch (forthcoming) replies. Some real-life cases are redolent of proof paradox 
vignettes (Redmayne (1996); Koehler (2001)), but they differ substantially, often in overlooked ways. The real-life Smith 
v. Rapid Transit evidence, for example, involves no ratios or numerical probabilities. Gardiner (forthcoming-b; 2019) 
contrasts Smith v. Rapid Transit with proof paradox vignettes.   
17  Greer (2018) argues for lowering penalties for rape to secure more rape convictions.  
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commitment, more accused individuals should face severe sanctions, despite the absence of significant 
individualised evidence beyond the accusation. Rejecting Claims A or B, however, renders rape harder 
to prove.  
 
The proof paradox challenges quantifiable balance conceptions of legal standards of proof, such as 
that the preponderance standard is a 0.5 evidential probability threshold.18 This is because the evidence 
available underwrites a high numerical evidential probability, but seems insufficient for an affirmative 
verdict. The ‘she said, he said’ paradox also threatens quantifiable balance conceptions of legal 
standards: In ‘she said, he said’ cases, the quantifiable balance surpasses 50%. But a relative virtue of 
the ‘she said, he said’ paradox is that insofar as it challenges quantifiable balance conceptions, it also 
challenges other relevantly similar conceptions. Claim B of the ‘she said, he said’ paradox holds,  
 
Claim B. The ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard is satisfied if, after a well-executed 
investigation, given the evidence adduced, the proposition is probably true.  
 
Claim B is not restricted to numerical, quantifiable balance conceptions of probability. This contrasts 
with the corresponding claim of the proof paradox, which is limited to a quantifiable balance 
conception.  
  
Claim 2. The ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard is satisfied if, after a well-executed 
investigation, given the evidence adduced, the proposition is more than 50% probable.  
 
We can resolve the proof paradox by denying the claim that the preponderance standard is satisfied if 
the litigated claim exceeds 50% evidential probability. We cannot, however, resolve the ‘she said, he 
said’ paradox by denying this claim; the paradox does not rely on this claim. This is because for a wide 
range of qualitative conceptions of evidential favouring, ‘she said, he said’ evidence favours the 
accusation.19 It is more normal for an accusation to be true and a denial false, for example, than the 
converse. If an accusation is false, this is surprising; the aberration from the norm demands 
explanation. This suggests ‘she said, he said’ evidence normically supports the accusation; evidence 
normically supports a proposition when, roughly speaking, given that evidence, the proposition would 
normally be true.20 The truth of the accusation better explains the available evidence than the truth of 
the denial; more plausible and simple narratives are available if the accusation is true. The accusation’s 
truth coheres better with background facts, such as human nature, than the denial’s truth. Belief in 
guilt from ‘she said, he said’ evidence is plausibly more safe than belief based on Gatecrasher One 
evidence; error is a more distant possibility.21 The available evidence is also more sensitive to truth.22  
 
On various conceptions of which epistemic properties justify belief, insofar as you should believe one 
speaker, you should believe the accuser rather than the denier. You should have higher confidence in 
                                               
18  Gardiner (2020) argues proof paradox vignettes threaten other theories of legal proof, such as Pritchard’s (2017) safety-
based account.  
19  Gardiner (ms-b) argues for the epistemic potency of rape accusations.  
20  Cf. Smith (2016; 2018), Gardiner (2018), Littlejohn (this volume).  
21  Pritchard (2005; 2017). 
22  Evidence in ‘she said, he said’ cases, but not in most proof paradox cases, typically tracks the truth. The inculpatory 
evidence in Gatecrasher One would be the same regardless of whether Pam gatecrashed. But if the accused did not 
rape, typically the accusation would have not have been issued. Accusations—but not their pedigree—is sensitive to 
truth. Cf. Roush (2005). This epistemic feature of ‘she said, he said’ evidence could be leveraged against the liberal 
commitment articulated by Claims E and F.  
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the accusation and, absent further evidence, be more suspicious about the denial. These properties 
plausibly do more than render the accusation numerically probable. They also underwrite qualitative 
forms of epistemic support. The ‘she said, he said’ paradox accordingly threatens more conceptions 
of standards of proof than the proof paradox can.    
 
To summarise: We can respond to the proof paradox by rejecting Claim Two, and supplanting it with 
a more demanding conception of the preponderance standard.23 Perhaps ‘preponderance’ requires not 
merely that the litigated claim exceeds 50% evidential probability, for example, but also that the 
evidence normically supports the conclusion. This might plausibly resolve the proof paradox. But ‘she 
said, he said’ evidence favours the accusation on various conceptions of epistemic support and so may 
well satisfy the revised conception of the preponderance standard. Merely denying the quantifiable 
balance conception of legal proof does not resolve the ‘she said, he said’ paradox. It is a more resilient 
paradox.  
 
 
7. The Epistemology of Preponderance  
This observation raises the question of whether there is a conception of the preponderance standard 
such that ‘she said, he said’ evidence fails to satisfy that standard. That is, can we resolve the paradox 
by revising Claim B, our conception of the epistemology of the preponderance standard? 
 
One such strategy holds that satisfying a legal standard of proof requires producing independent 
corroborative inculpatory evidence. Another strategy avers that legal proof requires ruling out relevant 
alternatives, and—crucially for this strategy—‘she said, he said’ evidence leaves relevant alternatives 
uneliminated.24 The rape is not proven to a preponderance of the evidence, on this view, unless the 
evidence addresses all relevant error possibilities, and some relevant error possibilities are not 
addressed by rape accusations alone. One way to develop this view holds that if two involved 
antagonists make conflicting claims, it is a relevant alternative that one is simply lying when they report 
to the third party. On this conception, ‘she said, he said’ evidence fails to satisfy the preponderance 
standard because it does not address this error possibility. Further evidence, such as the accuser’s 
contacting her therapist immediately afterwards, would address this possibility. Given this further 
evidence, it is still possible that she is lying, but only if she also deceives the therapist; the ‘simple lie’ 
error possibility is addressed because the only remaining uneliminated error possibilities involve 
addition deceptions.25  
 
This view might support the claim that ‘she said, he said’ evidence fails to satisfy the preponderance 
standard, but as stated the conception of the preponderance standard is implausibly demanding. If 
one antagonist claims something impossible or wholly implausible, this does not thereby render 
relevant the possibility that the other is lying. Suppose the defendant in a vandalism lawsuit asserts the 
plaintiff’s car was smashed by aliens, and the plaintiff denies this. The mere fact of conflicting 
testimony between antagonists does not render relevant that the plaintiff is lying about the absence of 
alien involvement. The defendant’s claim is too farfetched to take seriously. The strategy, then, must 
                                               
23  This strategy is pursued in, for example, Thomson (1986), Ho (2008), Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher (2012), Pritchard 
(2017), Moss (2018; forthcoming), Smith (2018), Gardiner (2019b), and Littlejohn (this volume). For surveys, see 
Redmayne (2008), Gardiner (2019a), and Pardo (2019).  
24  Ho (2008), Amaya (2015), Moss (2018; forthcoming), and Gardiner (2019; forthcoming-b) develop relevant alternatives 
conditions for legal standards of proof.  
25  For discussion, see Gardiner (2019b, forthcoming-a).  
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be refined. Not all antagonist disagreement can by itself render lying relevant. The refinement must 
walk a tightrope: It must articulate constraints on when conflicting antagonist testimony itself renders 
lying relevant; but they cannot be too restrictive if the accuser’s lying is a relevant alternative in all or 
typical ‘she said, he said’ cases.  
 
I endorse neither the corroboration requirement nor the relevant alternative strategies for resolving 
the ‘she said, he said’ paradox by denying Claim B.26 Note such strategies render rape harder to prove 
because, as noted above, there is often little substantial corroborative evidence. Whether this is an 
objection depends on the aims of legal institutions. If rape is difficult to prove, is this a problem with 
the epistemological features of legal proof, a fault within social or legal institutions, or simply one of 
the tragic features of the crime? 
 
Thus it appears challenging to resolve the ‘she said, he said’ paradox by denying that ‘she said, he said’ 
evidence satisfies the preponderance standard. This is because on various conceptions of epistemic 
support that might characterise the preponderance standard, ‘she said, he said’ evidence can satisfy it. 
Indeed, one way to understand the crux of the ‘she said, he said’ paradox is the contrast between how 
epistemically forceful rape accusations are compared to the relatively low preponderance standard; 
accusations are so epistemically potent that they, by themselves, seem to satisfy the standard, at least 
on many construals of ‘preponderance’. The paradox arises because this threatens our liberal 
commitment against condemning individuals based on one person’s say so, at least in some cases in 
which the accuser is an involved antagonist rather than a disinterested party, and where she 
antecedently knows no independent exculpatory evidence can come to light absent her change of 
heart, and where she knows her accusation alone suffices for severe sanctions.27  
 
 
8. Higher Standards 
Perhaps rejecting Claim A also cannot resolve the paradox. Gardiner (ms) epistemically evaluates 
acquaintance rape accusations. I focus on three aspects: Track records of truth and falsity, incentives 
to lie, and which speaker typically possesses better evidence.28 This evaluation supports Claim C—in 
‘she said, he said’ cases, accusations are probably true. Claim C is relatively weak; it merely concerns 
what is more probable. But plausibly this non-individualised evidence renders accusations 
considerably more probable than denials. And so one might wonder whether accusations are so 
strongly indicative of rape—accusations are so likely true—that ‘she said, he said’ evidence also 
satisfies higher standards of proof, such as the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard.  
 
Suppose one holds that Title IX investigations should be governed by the clear and convincing 
evidence standard. Ostensibly this view escapes the paradox—it denies Claim A. But acquaintance 
rape accusations are rarely false. Kelly et al (2005) suggests false rape claims tend to exhibit distinctive 
features—they describe violent stranger rape and do not accuse specific individuals, for example, or 
accuse government officials for financial motives. As Newman (2017) describes, false rape claims tend 
to look very different from acquaintance rape accusations. Plausibly, by contrast, acquaintance rape 
                                               
26  Gardiner (2019b) develops a relevant alternatives account of legal proof, but does not discuss whether ‘she said, he 
said’ evidence characteristically leaves relevant alternatives uneliminated. Gardiner (forthcoming-a) applies the relevant 
alternatives account to the epistemology of rape accusations and investigates when and why the accuser’s speaking 
falsely is a relevant alternative. 
27  Gardiner (ms: §8) defends the liberal commitment; this two-pronged defence highlights epistemic weaknesses of 
accusations and socio-political motivations.     
28  These aspects are not independent; incentives to lie underwrite high false denial rates, for example.  
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denials are typically false.29 If so, perhaps ‘she said, he said’ evidence also satisfies the clear and 
convincing evidence standard. Correspondingly, an adjacent paradox arises:  
 
Claim A′. ‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is the correct standard 
The ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard should govern Title IX proceedings.  
 
Claim B′. Gloss on the ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard  
The ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard is satisfied if, after a well-executed investigation, 
the total evidence adduced clearly and convincingly supports the proposition.  
 
Claim C′. ‘She said, he said’ evidence is clear and convincing 
In ‘she said, he said’ cases, the total available evidence (commonly, characteristically, normally, 
or at least sometimes) clearly and convincingly supports the proposition. 
 
Claim D. Considerable consequences 
Finding an individual culpable of rape can warrant considerable consequences, such as 
expulsion.  
 
Claim E. Liberal claim 
In some cases of mere one-on-one conflicting testimony, considerable institutional 
consequences—such as expulsion—are not legitimatised because the evidence is mere one-on-
one competing testimony from two antagonists, absent any further significant individualised 
evidence.  
 
Claim F′. Connector claim 
At least some conflicting testimony cases described by Claim E are normal ‘she said, he said’ 
cases, like those featured in Claim C′.  
 
Some readers endorse Claim C′. They aver that ‘she said, he said’ cases normally, or at least sometimes, 
provide clear and convincing evidence. Arguably the epistemic force of the maxim to believe accusers, 
recently articulated by the hashtag #BelieveWomen, is that rape accusations are—by themselves and 
despite denials—clear and convincing evidence. On this view, they are believable because an impartial, 
objective epistemic evaluation of the epistemology of rape accusations finds them clear and 
convincing.30 But Claim C′ generates a ‘she said, he said’ paradox for the higher DeVos standard.  
 
Recall the quantifiable balance conception of the clear and convincing evidence standard. On this 
view, if the litigated claim is at least, say, 70% or 75% probable given the evidence, the standard is 
satisfied. This means that—if rape accusations have a sufficiently high truth-to-falsity ratio, and 
corresponding denials are often enough false—‘she said, he said’ cases typically satisfy the standard.31  
 
This reasoning suggests a further argument against the quantifiable balance conception of legal 
standards. Suppose you think beyond reasonable doubt is a quantifiable balance threshold, such as 
                                               
29  Gardiner (ms) defends these claims. Cf. Jordan (2001), Kelly et al. (2005), and Lisak et al (2010). Note that stranger 
rapes are often not, strictly speaking, accusations: No individual is accused.  
30  Ferzan (2021) and Bolinger (2021) discuss the epistemology of #BelieveWomen.  
31  It is possible that accusations are almost always true, yet denials are also always true. This is because not all accusations 
lead to denials. Perhaps accusations that lead to denials are disproportionately false.  
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90% or 95% evidential probability. If the truth-to-falsity ratio amongst accusations is sufficiently high, 
and amongst denials sufficiently low, then normally ‘she said, he said’ evidence renders the accusation 
above 90% or 95% probable. And so, given the quantifiable balance conception, ‘she said, he said’ 
evidence, including in cases like Transmitted Accusation, satisfies the reasonable doubt standard. But 
this seems implausible. Even if ‘she said, he said’ evidence sometimes proves guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt, Transmitted Accusation evidence cannot: Criminal culpability cannot be established merely by 
membership in a sufficiently inculpatory reference class. 
 
I think rape accusations usually are true, warrant belief, and are compelling evidence; Gardiner (ms) 
argues at length for their excellent epistemic standing. But it seems dogmatic or unimaginative to say 
‘she said, he said’ evidence can, since non-individualised base rate evidence is sufficiently supportive, 
provide proof beyond reasonable doubt.32 The reference class—accusations—strongly indicates truth, 
but there is nonetheless sometimes room for reasonable doubts. As with proof paradox vignettes, 
comparing ‘she said, he said’ cases to the reasonable doubt standard suggests reference class 
membership cannot by itself satisfy beyond reasonable doubt, and accordingly the legal standard is 
not a quantifiable balance threshold.   
 
 
9. Doubting the Category 
I conclude by evaluating two other responses to the original ‘she said, he said’ paradox. The first denies 
the ‘she said, he said’ category is cogent. ‘She said, he said’ cases, recall, are accusations of rape, 
followed by denials, with no further significant individualised evidence available to the evaluator. But, 
as I noted in section five, further evidence influences evaluation of testimony. We have antecedent 
background beliefs about how plausible or likely the content is, which topics and contexts beget honest 
assertions and accurate beliefs, and about speaker veracity, either for individuals, members of reference 
classes, or testimony in general. We harbour background beliefs—often unacknowledged, 
overconfident, or inaccurate—about the conduct of ‘real’ rape victims and perpetrators.  
 
These background beliefs influence how third-parties evaluate rape accusations and denials, and 
underlie disagreement about which cases qualify as mere ‘she said, he said’ cases, as opposed to cases 
with further significant individualised evidence. Evidence deemed significant by some is deemed paltry 
or nonprobative by others. This is commonly seen with, for example, accusations when the accuser 
was friendly to the accused after the incident in question. Many third-party evaluators consider this 
not a ‘she said, he said’ case because they regard the friendliness as significant exculpatory 
individualised evidence. Other third-party evaluators regard this conduct as insignificant evidence—
or not evidence at all—against the accusation because it is normal for acquaintance rape victims to be 
friendly to their assailant afterwards. They can regard it a ‘she said, he said’ case. Such disagreements 
might suggest we cannot make sense of ‘she said, he said’ cases as a class, because the definition 
includes the lack of ‘further significant individualised evidence’, but background beliefs play an 
ineliminable role in evaluating testimony; we cannot isolate the epistemic role of testimony from that 
of background beliefs.  
 
I do not find this response to the paradox compelling. Firstly, epistemological vignettes often stipulate 
that the central or only evidence is testimonial; the epistemic role of background beliefs in such 
                                               
32  I think uncorroborated rape accusations warrant belief, but the ‘she said, he said’ paradox needs only the weaker Claim 
C. Note also it would be welcome news, for feminist reasons, if my reservations are unduly cautious and rape 
accusations are by themselves epistemically potent enough to satisfy beyond reasonable doubt.   
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vignettes does not typically impede theorising about the epistemic force of testimony. The relative 
chariness about the ‘she said, he said’ category may emerge from an encultured underestimation of the 
epistemic force of rape accusations relative to the perceived importance of background facts such as 
conduct and character. This overestimation of the relative significance of nontestimonial evidence 
when evaluating rape accusations leads us to think we cannot cleave the epistemic force of such 
accusations from an evaluation of whether, for example, the accuser seems sufficiently upset.  
 
Secondly, most such supplementary facts, such as the accuser’s friendliness or asserters’ mannerisms, 
are consistent with ‘she said, he said’ cases; they are nonprobative or not highly probative, but 
evaluators erroneously regard them as significant evidence. Given this, we need not hand-wring over 
how precisely to delineate ‘she said, he said’ cases. Claim C is likely true even under a broad conception 
of the category. Indeed, we are likely unreliable or anti-reliable at estimating the probative force of 
such evidence. Narrative gaps and inconsistencies, fidgeting, evasiveness, irresolute emotions and 
reactive attitudes, not realising or reporting until much later, and so on are taken to be individualised 
evidence of false accusations, for example, but are symptoms of trauma.33 On hearing the paradox, 
some people emphasise that real-life cases exhibit additional evidence, such as mannerisms; the 
implication is that real-life cases are never bare ‘she said, he said’ cases. I think this response 
overestimates our reliability at discerning truth in such contexts.   
 
Thirdly, as argued above, the paradox permits congenial flexibility about which cases qualify; what 
matters is consistency within the paradox, such that at least some cases—or class of cases—are 
described by both Claims C and E.34 Fourthly, one can recreate the paradox by focusing on a single 
accusation and denial, such that Claims C and E describe the case. The case could be imaginary, like 
Transmitted Accusation, or a concrete real-life case. Focusing on a single case circumvents conceiving 
of cases via the ‘she said, he said’ category. So long as the claims hold for at least one example—actual 
or merely possible—the paradox arises. And I think such cases will arise: As noted earlier, I think the 
tension between the claims is felt for some real-life cases. Finally, Claims C and E stem not only from 
intuition about real-life cases but also from principled reflection on the epistemic and social 
importance of the distinction between individualised and non-individualised evidence. This distinction 
itself generates the possibility of accusations that are epistemically well-supported by non-
individualised evidence, but that do not legitimate considerable consequences because the only 
individualised inculpatory evidence is isolated antagonist testimony. For these reasons, I doubt 
demurral about precisely delineating the ‘she said, he said’ category can evade the paradox.  
 
 
10. Title IX Overhaul 
Various people suggest the following response to the paradox: US educational institutions should 
abandon the existing Title IX system, which is loosely based on legal adjudication. The Obama 
standard and DeVos revision apply to a system in which complainants, their representatives, or an 
institutional authority must establish a claim to a particular epistemic threshold before imposing 
sanctions. Interlocuters suggest that for sexual misconduct accusations in US educational institutions, 
                                               
33  Thanks to Sarah Robins and Hilary Kornblith for discussion. 
34  Philosophy generally requires charitable interpretation of cases. As Williamson (2007) notes, we can imagine ways of 
filling out Gettier cases, for example, which fail to constitute a counterexample to the target theory. But theorists 
instead interpret the vignettes nondeviantly. Responding to Williamson, Gardiner (2015) emphasises the ineliminable 
role of normal interpretations of vignettes for philosophical theorising. Similarly we should focus on ‘she said, he said’ 
and proof paradox examples that can—rather than fail to—illustrate the tension among Claims A–F and 1–4. 
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this format should be replaced with a model that does not require standards of proof.35 One proposed 
rival model is restorative justice, which focuses on rehabilitation, reconciliation, and repairing harms, 
rather than punishing or removing the offender from the relevant community. Others propose a 
private industry model, in which authorities can typically respond as they see fit—demotions, moving 
departments, adjusting schedules or responsibilities, termination of employment, and so on—without 
first needing to prove claims to a particular epistemic threshold. These responses to the paradox deny 
Claim A; they aver Title IX investigations should not be governed by the preponderance standard. 
But rather than propose a higher standard, they overhaul the system entirely.  
 
In response, these rival approaches themselves face problems. Restorative justice might be 
unsatisfying to victims, for example, or be insufficiently consequential given that other campus 
misconduct, such as non-sexual assault, elicits orthodox sanctions. Educational institutions are a 
public good and play distinctive structural roles in society, including bestowing qualifications and 
imprimatur. These features might make the private industry model inappropriate for sanctions such 
as expulsion. That is, plausibly a student has a greater right to remain enrolled in college, despite 
accusations, than to remain in private employment in light of accusations; more formal procedures 
are needed to expel a student.  
 
The paradox is not easily evaded. Suppose Title IX procedures at US educational institutions are 
revised to eschew standards of proof. This might be a practical response to the paradox, but the 
tensions underlying the paradox remain. The tensions arise from general features of testimony, legal 
proof, epistemic thresholds, sanctions, rights, and the distinction between individualised and non-
individualised evidence. Adjacent paradoxes can thus arise for various legal and institutional contexts, 
such as child custody, civil damages, revoking licences, employment tribunals, and criminal conviction. 
Variations of the paradox may even arise for interpersonal relationships, such as friendships. I 
conclude by highlighting three questions at the core of the ‘she said, he said’ paradox.  
 
Firstly, how can we reconcile the potent epistemic force of rape accusations—they are excellent 
evidence of guilt—with our liberal commitment against condemnation by one person’s say so when 
the accuser knows in advance that no other evidence can come to light absent her change of heart and 
that her accusation alone suffices for serious sanctions?  
 
Secondly, how can we reconcile a conception of standards of proof as quantifiable balance 
thresholds—or even thresholds of qualitative epistemic properties such as safety—with our judgement 
that some kinds of evidence cannot by themselves satisfy those standards? After all, non-individualised 
evidence, such as base rates and background knowledge about psychology and culture, render the 
litigated claims highly probable, safe, and so on. So why doesn’t this evidence alone legitimate 
affirmative verdicts?  
 
Finally, how can we reconcile the feminist tenet that findings of culpability for rape warrant 
considerable consequences, and should express weighty social meaning, with the claim that such 
findings should be governed by the relatively low preponderance standard? One might object that 
expulsion and termination of employment are not severe sanctions. I grant they are not severe relative 
to the crime of rape. But they are relatively severe when contrasted with the tenuity of the 
preponderance standard. Preponderance, bear in mind, is usually glossed as merely more likely than 
not.  
                                               
35  Thanks to Clayton Littlejohn and Alannah Tomich for helpful discussions.  
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These unresolved tensions form the heart of the ‘she said, he said’ paradox.   
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